Georgia Law Review
Volume 55

Number 2

Article 6

2021

The Lost Approach to FLSA Settlement Agreements: A Freedomof-Contract Approach
Madison G. Conkel
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Conkel, Madison G. (2021) "The Lost Approach to FLSA Settlement Agreements: A Freedom-of-Contract
Approach," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 55: No. 2, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Conkel: The Lost Approach to FLSA Settlement Agreements: A Freedom-of-Con

THE LOST APPROACH TO FLSA
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: A FREEDOMOF-CONTRACT APPROACH
Madison G. Conkel*
In jurisdictions that require judicial oversight of Fair Labor
Standards Act settlement agreements, a question lingers: What
exactly should judges review? Some judges have begun
categorically striking confidentiality provisions from
settlement agreements by pointing to the purposes and goals of
the FLSA. The academic community lauds these courts’ efforts
to prevent employers from mandating employees’ silence about
the terms of their settlement agreements. This Note, however,
makes the counterargument: confidentiality provisions should
be permitted in FLSA settlements agreements as a bargaining
chip for employees who bring individual suits. If higher courts
in a given jurisdiction require judicial oversight of these
agreements, then the court reviewing the settlement should look
at the process that led to the settlement agreement, instead of
its substance, when assessing the agreement’s fairness.
Alongside Department of Labor enforcement actions, a processbased review would address problems that confidentiality
provisions create for the national enforcement of labor rights
and would allow the suffering employee to maximize their
recovery.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have long protected individual rights and
liberties.1 Courts most often derive these rights and liberties from
the U.S. Constitution,2 but rights can also come from federal
statutes.3 One federal statute that grants individual rights is the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).4 The FLSA guarantees
certain classes of workers minimum wages and premium overtime
pay.5 When employers violate these statutory guarantees, the FLSA
affords employees legal remedies.6
Like much litigation, these FLSA cases often end in settlement
agreements between employers and employees.7 In circuits that
have ruled on the issue, the trend has been to require judicial or
Department of Labor supervision of these settlement agreements.8
1 See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (finding, as an empirical matter, that the U.S. Supreme
Court can have counter-majoritarian tendencies).
2 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding that the right of
same-sex couples to marry is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (holding that the right to an abortion was within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Cause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (finding a fundamental right to marry within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
3 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2018) (codifying the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, which prohibits age discrimination in employment); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
(conferring a right on individuals to sue for damages caused by persons acting under the color
of state law in violation of their constitutional rights); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (codifying
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits unlawful discrimination in
employment).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018) (the FLSA).
5 Id. § 206 (codifying minimum wage requirements for employers); id. § 207 (codifying
maximum hour limitations for employees).
6 Id. § 216(b) (giving employees a private right of action against employers who violate the
FLSA); id. § 216(c) (giving the Secretary of Labor a cause of action against the employer for
violations).
7 See Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 111 (2013) (noting
that “only 1.2 percent of [FLSA] claims are heard on the merits before a jury or judge”).
8 See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)
(requiring oversight of FLSA settlement agreements by either the courts or the Secretary of
Labor). But see Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 257 (5th Cir. 2012)
(requiring judicial oversight only in particular circumstances).
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Oversight of settlement agreements has spurred debate among
legal scholars and circuit courts about the propriety of judicial
intervention.9
In jurisdictions where oversight has become normalized, many
lower courts have begun looking at the substance of settlement
agreements when approving or disapproving them.10 Many courts
now refuse to approve settlement agreements containing
confidentiality provisions because these provisions are deemed to be
contrary to the policies behind the Fair Labor Standards Act.11
Scholarship on this issue has primarily focused on whether
judicial or Department of Labor oversight of settlement agreements
is necessary and whether it should continue.12 A few arguments

9 See, e.g., Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)
(requiring judicial oversight of FLSA settlements); Martin, 688 F.3d at 257 (requiring judicial
oversight only in particular circumstances); Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355 (requiring
oversight of settlement agreements); see also Keith William Diener, Judicial Approval of
FLSA Back Wages Settlement Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 25 (2017)
(analyzing the circuit courts’ different approaches to approving FLSA settlement agreements
and arguing for a more unified approach); Alex Lau, Note, The FLSA Permission Slip:
Determining Whether FLSA Settlements and Voluntary Dismissals Require Approval, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 227 (2017) (assessing whether the voluntary dismissal provision in
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to FLSA settlements).
10 This has included assessing the confidentiality provisions included in settlement
agreements. See, e.g., Brown v. TrueBlue, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00514, 2013 WL 5408575, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2013) (finding that “this confidentiality provision frustrates the
implementation of the FLSA in the workplace, and therefore [this court] cannot approve it”);
Altenbach v. Lube Ctr., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-02178, 2013 WL 74251, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2013)
(“Such a [confidentiality] provision contravenes the FLSA in that it permits Defendant to
retaliate against a Plaintiff and promotes the silencing of an employee who has vindicated a
disputed FLSA right.”). But see, e.g., Farris v. Nat’l Forensic Consultants Inc., No. 18-3052,
2019 WL 2502267, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2019) (finding that a confidentiality provision was
“narrowly drawn and thus [did] not frustrate the FLSA’s purpose”).
11 See, e.g., Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1242–43 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“A
confidentiality provision in an FLSA settlement agreement both contravenes the legislative
purpose of the FLSA and undermines the Department of Labor’s regulatory effort to notify
employees of their FLSA rights. . . . The district court should reject as unreasonable a
compromise that contains a confidentiality provision, which is unenforceable and operates in
contravention of the FLSA.”). When evaluating FLSA settlements, courts also consider nondisparagement clauses, releases of claims, and “other . . . external circumstances that might
undermine the purposes of the FLSA.” Diener, supra note 9, at 46.
12 See Diener, supra note 9, at 32, 46 (analyzing the federal circuits’ “inconsistent”
approaches to FLSA settlement agreements); Lau, supra note 9, at 227 (assessing whether
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about the propriety of confidential settlements in the FLSA context
do exist, but they all tell the same story: confidentiality is contrary
to the FLSA’s public policy.13 Although some scholars briefly
address arguments against judicial voidance of confidentiality
provisions, they often quickly dispose of these arguments without
much scrutiny.14
After assuming that judicial oversight of settlement agreements
will continue, this Note argues that categorically striking
confidentiality provisions hampers individual employees who have
accepted the costs of litigation and brought suit against their
employer. In making this argument, it will contribute to the broader
academic discussion15 about whether confidentiality provisions
ought to be enforced in FLSA settlements. This Note moves beyond
the theoretical arguments for freedom of contract by comparing the
FLSA to other federal labor statutes protecting employees––Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)16––to
assess whether the FLSA is fundamentally different from other
labor statutes by requiring heightened judicial treatment of
settlement agreements.
Pointing to freedom of contract principles and to the employee’s
increased leverage in settlement negotiations when able to use
the voluntary dismissal provision of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
apply to FLSA cases).
13 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 111 (arguing that confidentiality hurts “thousands of lowwage workers” by “significantly reducing the amount of information available about wage
theft”); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927,
927 (2006) (arguing that “[i]nvisibility defeats the intent of the discrimination statutes”).
14 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 111 (noting that just over one percent of FLSA claims are
heard by a judge or jury); Kotkin, supra note 13, at 932 (“Judges overwhelmingly see the
negative outcomes [of employment discrimination suits], since the many favorable outcomes
are shielded from judicial imprimatur.”).
15 As discussed, the scholarship about these provisions is largely one-sided—both in the
FLSA and broader employment law context—where the consensus reflexively assumes that
courts must strike confidentiality provisions from settlement agreements because they are
contrary to FLSA policy goals. See supra note 13. While the anti-confidentiality argument
has obvious strengths—and appears to be the majority viewpoint in scholarship, though not
in practice—both sides should be represented in the debate. Arguments for confidentiality
may not be as harmful to employees and the workplace as one might think. Further, this Note
only discusses judicial oversight of FLSA settlement agreements, leaving open the question
of whether Department of Labor oversight of FLSA settlements are appropriate or
recommended.
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2018).
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confidentiality as a bargaining tool, this Note contends that
automatically striking these provisions harms employees who file
suit. Additionally, the societal disadvantages of confidentiality
provisions may be assuaged by the Department of Labor’s ability to
bring suit under the FLSA against an employer on behalf of all
employees affected by illegal behavior.17 Further, more nuanced
treatment of confidentiality provisions, such as assessing the exact
nature of what can or cannot be discussed or who the employee is
directly prevented from communicating with about the suit,18 might
better serve all the goals of the FLSA—full compensation to
employees and protection of the overall marketplace from wage and
hour violations. Courts can avoid critics’ concerns and give
employees greater bargaining power over negotiations by focusing
on the process, rather than the substance, of a settlement agreement
when assessing its fairness.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE FLSA
This Note argues that courts should not categorically strike
confidentiality provisions from FLSA settlement agreements. A
discussion of the history, purpose, and enforcement of the statute
would be useful before reasoning through the argument. Thus, this
Section discusses the history, purposes, and enforcement the FLSA
in turn.
A. HISTORY OF THE FLSA

Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 in the midst of the Great
Depression to stimulate the national economy and help individuals
who were struggling financially.19 Congress enacted the FLSA
17 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (empowering the Secretary of Labor to sue to enforce FLSA wage and
hour laws).
18 See, e.g., In re Chickie’s & Pete’s Wage & Hour Litig., No. 12-6820, 2014 WL 911718, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014) (“[T]he limited confidentiality provision here does not raise the
same issues. The . . . confidentiality provision does not . . . prohibit Plaintiffs from discussing
this matter with anyone, but only prohibits Plaintiffs from disparaging Defendants or
discussing the substance and negotiations of this matter with the press and media.”).
19 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 113 (stating that “concern for a national economy mired in
the Great Depression and for workers making below-subsistence wages” were
“complimentary policy goals” of the FLSA); Diener, supra note 9, at 26 (“The FLSA’s
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during a period when the judicial temperament toward national
legislation was shifting.20 Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court had
previously been a barrier to federal economic legislation, the “switch
in time” occurred in 193721—only one year prior to the FLSA’s
enactment––and made the Court more accommodating to the will of
Congress.22 In fact, after the “switch,” the Court in 1941 upheld the
FLSA under the Commerce Clause.23
Passed during a dramatically low economic point for the United
States, the FLSA appeared to be a glimmer of hope for workers and
for those concerned with the trajectory of the national economy,
thus illustrating that the FLSA had broader goals relating both to
individuals and to the national workforce.24
B. PURPOSE OF THE FLSA

Congress specified the purpose of the FLSA in the statute itself.25
Section 202 states that “labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
provisions intended to provide for a living wage, motivate employers to hire more employees,
and disperse the work among a broader population of workers.”).
20 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 973–74 (2000) (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court
switched from striking down to upholding New Deal legislation).
21 Scholars now refer to this switch in decision-making in 1937 as the “switch in time that
saved Nine” because the Court—supposedly in response to President Roosevelt’s threat to
pack the Court—stopped striking New Deal programs as unconstitutional exercises of power
and began upholding these programs under the Commerce Clause. See Friedman, supra note
20, at 973–74 (“Prior to the ‘switch in time that saved Nine,’ the Court invalidated a number
of New Deal measures, one after another. After the switch, the Court removed itself as an
obstacle to economic legislation . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
22 Compare, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1895) (restricting
Congress’s power to regulate manufacturing under the Commerce Clause), and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) (same), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34–37 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act under Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941)
(upholding FLSA’s minimum wage provisions under Congress’s Commerce Clause powers).
23 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115, 125 (upholding the FLSA despite freedom-of-contract
implications and its paternalistic nature).
24 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 113 (“Congress’s intent to bring about fair competition,
greater purchasing power for workers – and consequently a healthier economy – is evident in
the declared policy of the Act . . . .”).
25 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2018) (stating the FLSA’s policy).
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health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers” likewise
“burden[] commerce and the free flow of goods,” create unfair
competition and labor disputes, and interfere with the “fair
marketing of goods in commerce.”26
The statutory language illustrates that the purpose of the FLSA
is two-fold: (1) to protect individual workers from unfair labor
practices and (2) to protect the overall workforce and national
economy from a race to the bottom with wages and with
requirements for increased hours.27 This broader purpose of
protecting the national economy perhaps distinguishes the FLSA
from other employment statutes, like Title VII and the ADEA,28
which focus on preventing discrimination against individuals
rather than on bolstering the national workforce and economy.29
C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FLSA

If an employer violates the FLSA, the statute provides two paths
to rectify the violation.30 First, the employee can bring a private
lawsuit against the employer.31 Second, the Secretary of Labor can
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the employee against the employer and
supervise the payment of back wages owed by the employer to the
employee.32
This first mechanism, an employee-initiated suit against an
employer, is this Note’s primary focus because this context requires
judicial or Department of Labor (DOL) oversight of a resulting

Id. § 202(a).
See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 112–14 (discussing FLSA rights as “quasi-public rights”).
28 Cf. Lau, supra note 9, at 241 (comparing Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave
Act, which are generally applicable statutes that do not solely protect one group of people,
with the ADEA and FLSA, which are designed to help specific groups—such as older workers
and “the most vulnerable, lowest paid segments of the workforce” respectively).
29 This point is only true to a certain extent. The manner in which Title VII and the ADEA
protect individual employees also affects the national economy and society once the employees
are considered in the aggregate.
30 See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the two routes of enforcement in FLSA’s penalties provision).
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (creating a private right of action for employees to recover
from their employers).
32 See § 216(c) (permitting the Secretary of Labor to litigate an FLSA claim on behalf of an
employee).
26
27
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settlement agreement in certain circuits or circumstances.33
Importantly, the availability of other enforcement mechanisms
supports a more deferential stance toward settlement agreements
between parties. If the Department of Labor can sue on behalf of
employees potentially affected by the employer’s malfeasance, then
depriving an individual employee of the ability to use confidentiality
as a bargaining chip to purportedly help other affected employees
seems unnecessary.34
For many reasons, a wronged employee may prefer to be an
individual plaintiff rather than a member of a class of employees on
whose behalf the Department of Labor is bringing suit. First, when
an individual employee sues, they get the full recovery amount from
the settlement or the final adjudication.35 Additionally, the FLSA
permits a successful plaintiff-employee to recover attorney’s fees
from their FLSA-violating employer.36 Second, being an individual
plaintiff guarantees greater control over the outcome of a case.37
There are costs, however, to being an individual plaintiff
bringing suit. Costs of litigation are well-known, including
attorney’s fees, filing fees, and other related costs.38 There are also
33 However, in Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352, the Department of Labor brought a suit for
back wages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). The employer then approached his employees about
settling the case. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the settlement. Id. at 1355.
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2018) (allowing the Secretary of Labor to bring an FLSA suit on
behalf of multiple employees). Notably, however, if the Department of Labor brings an
enforcement action against an employer, then the agency action precludes an employee from
bringing an individual suit under § 216(b). Id. (“The right provided by [§ 216(b)] to bring an
action by or on behalf of any employee to recover the liability specified . . . and of any
employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action shall terminate upon the filing of [the
Department’s § 216(c) action].”).
35 See id. § 216(b) (indicating the amount recoverable by an employee in an action against
their employer).
36 See id. (“The court in such action shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of the action.”).
37 See Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Action Lawsuit, WILLIG WILLIAMS
DAVIDSON,
https://www.wwdlaw.com/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-a-class-actionlawsuit/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (noting that individual “plaintiffs relinquish control over
the case” when joining a class action).
38 See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the
Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 309–10 (2014) (indicating that a
“conventional” view of class actions’ advantage accounts for various costs incurred in
litigation). The attorney’s fees provision in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) decreases some of the
litigation cost. These fees, however, are limited to successful plaintiffs, so a potential plaintiff-
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the intangible costs of time and energy associated with bringing
suit. Theoretically, these costs already deter many plaintiffs from
bringing suit.39

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Parties involved in lawsuits can generally resolve their disputes
without judicial oversight.40 In some scenarios, however, the
judiciary must approve a settlement agreement or the case’s
termination.41 Nowhere in the FLSA is judicial oversight expressly
required.42 Nevertheless, some circuits have required some degree
of judicial oversight, and a few require oversight in all FLSA
settlement agreements.43 Without the U.S. Supreme Court
providing the final word on whether FLSA settlement agreements
are subject to judicial oversight, the district or circuit in which an
employee files an FLSA claim matters a great deal for a plaintiff’s
autonomy in determining the outcome of their case.44
Before addressing whether courts should be categorically
striking confidentiality from FLSA settlements, this Note first
discusses the threshold issue of judicial supervision. Discussion of
the supervision issue is important for this Note’s overall argument
employee will not know at the time they initiate their suit whether they will recover those
litigation costs.
39 See WILLIG WILLIAMS DAVIDSON, supra note 37 (noting that a small damages claim of a
few hundred dollars “may not be worthwhile” because of “the time and money required to
pursue [an] individual action”).
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (allowing plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their claims
within certain parameters).
41 For example, under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court must approve settlement
plans for Chapter 13 filers pursuant to particular statutory requirements. See 11 U.S.C. §§
1322(a), 1325 (2018) (outlining certain requirements that a debtor’s plan must meet to receive
court confirmation); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015 (requiring a debtor to file a repayment plan
within a certain time period after filing a petition).
42 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018) (illustrating that the FLSA does not
specifically require court oversight of settlement agreements).
43 See Diener, supra note 9, at 55 tbl.1 (outlining the current breakdown of circuit courts’
treatment of judicial oversight of FLSA settlement agreements).
44 As of 2017, the Eleventh and Second Circuits require judicial supervision of FLSA
settlements in all cases; the Fifth and Federal Circuits do not always require supervision of
settlements; the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have acknowledged the issue
but have not decided the level of supervision required; and the First, Third, Sixth, Tenth and
D.C. Circuits have not spoken on the issue. Id.
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because judicial supervision is a prerequisite to courts’ power to
strike confidentiality provisions. In its ultimate argument, this Note
assumes that courts will continue supervising FLSA settlement
agreements, but it argues that courts should not categorically strike
confidentiality provisions.
A. ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY OVERSIGHT OF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS

In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit unconditionally mandated judicial
oversight of FLSA settlement agreements in Lynn’s Food.45 In
Lynn’s Food, the court rejected an employer-employee negotiated
settlement agreement after the Department of Labor brought suits
against the employer for violating the employees’ FLSA rights.46
The Eleventh Circuit clearly stated that judicial oversight of
settlement agreements would be required moving forward:
[T]here is only one context in which compromises of
FLSA back wage or liquidated damage claims may be
allowed: a stipulated judgment entered by a court which
has determined that a settlement proposed by an
employer and employees, in a suit brought by the
employees under the FLSA, is a fair and reasonable
res[o]lution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA
provisions.47
The Second Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandatoryoversight rule in 2015.48 In Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.,
the circuit court found that, in order for a district court to dismiss a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), the district court
or the Department of Labor must approve the parties’ settlement.49
The court rested its reasoning for mandatory oversight on the
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1354–55 (invalidating the settlement agreement).
47 See id. at 1355.
48 See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that “dismissals settling FLSA claims with prejudice require the approval of the district court
or the [Department of Labor] to take effect”).
49 Id. (stating that Rule 41(a) dismissals “require the approval of the district court or the
[Department of Labor] to take affect”).
45
46
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FLSA’s “unique policy considerations.”50 These goals, according to
the Second Circuit, included “‘insuring to all our able-bodied
working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work”51 and
“remedy[ing] the evil of overwork . . . [and] applying financial
pressure on employers to reduce overtime.”52 Because the FLSA
seeks to protect workers, the settlement of employees’ cases should
be afforded the same level of protection that the statute itself
guarantees to labor rights.53
Scholars latched on to the Eleventh and Second Circuits’
reasoning, arguing that anything less than judicial or Department
of Labor oversight would result in inequitable settlements for
employees.54 For example, Keith Diener argues for at least minimal
oversight using philosophy’s harm principle.55 Derived from a
general rule that liberty and autonomy should be prioritized in the
private marketplace, the harm principle limits this norm by
prohibiting individuals from acting in ways that could injure other
people.56 Though parties independently negotiate FLSA settlement
agreements, the harm principle still requires some regulation and
oversight of these agreements due to the potential for unequal
bargaining sophistication between employers and employees and
the potential for a resulting settlement agreement that impacts
other employees whose rights have also suffered at their employers’
hands.57 The argument for judicial or Department of Labor
supervision of FLSA agreements thus relies on the policies
Id.
Id. (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
52 Id. (quoting Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2008)).
53 Id. (noting that “[i]n service of the statute’s remedial and humanitarian goals, the
Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the Act liberally and afforded its protections
exceptionally broad coverage” (alteration in original) (quoting Chao, 514 F.3d at 285)).
54 See, e.g., Diener, supra note 9, at 65 (arguing that Department of Labor oversight of
FLSA settlement agreements prevents harm to “vulnerable employees”); Lau, supra note 9,
at 260 (arguing that the risk of “predatory employers taking advantage of uninformed,
unrepresented employees” requires oversight of settlements).
55 Diener, supra note 9, at 65 (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.” (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859))).
56 Id. (explaining that “liberty and autonomy . . . do not provide a blank moral check to do
anything one desires”).
57 Id. (“The supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages is intended to
prevent harm to vulnerable employees who may be taken advantage of by their employers.”).
50
51
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underlying the FLSA and the realistic limits to liberty and
autonomy under the harm principle.
B. ARGUMENT AGAINST MANDATORY OVERSIGHT OF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS

Despite a few circuits’ taking a strong, pro-oversight stance on
FLSA settlement agreements,58 this idea is far from achieving
national consensus. As previously noted, nine—that is, most—
circuits have yet to decide the issue of oversight.59 Therefore, this
Section explores arguments against settlement oversight that may
be motivating a majority of circuits.
Diener offers four arguments against settlement agreement
oversight.60 First, the FLSA does not expressly mandate oversight;
therefore, reading that requirement into the FLSA is a broad leap.61
Second, requiring oversight in the FLSA wage context (without
explicit textual support) “represents a judicial prioritization” of
these wage rights over other rights.62 Third, oversight increases the
case load of the courts and burdens attorneys representing workers
in FLSA cases. Fourth, most settlement agreements are not
seriously scrutinized and are “routinely approved.”63
The first and third arguments are the most compelling, given the
substantial impact that the oversight requirement imposes on the
judiciary and Department of Labor to oversee an incredible number

The Eleventh and Second Circuits require FLSA settlements to be supervised in all
cases; the Fifth and Federal Circuits require supervision of settlements under particular
conditions. See Diener, supra note 9, at 55 tbl.1.
59 The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits acknowledge the question of FLSA
settlement supervision but have yet to decide what, if any, level of supervision is required.
Id. The First, Third, Sixth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits have not spoken on the issue. Id.
60 Diener, supra note 9, at 65 (providing “four . . . reasons why one might oppose the
supervision of FLSA settlement agreements”). Note that Diener’s analysis leads him to the
opposite conclusion: settlement agreements should be overseen by the courts or DOL. Id. at
26. He still, however, offers a comprehensive discussion of the arguments against oversight.
Id. at 27.
61 Id. at 66 (“[T]he policies that were utilized to develop the supervisory requirement are
not found in the express language of the FLSA . . . .”).
62 Id.
63 Id.
58
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of cases.64 The vast case load also supports the fourth argument:
even if a valid legal and policy basis exists for overseeing the
settlement, lack of resources prohibits any real oversight and
potentially results in rubber-stamp approval of any settlement that
comes before the court. It seems unwise to require federal courts
with already heavy caseloads65 to oversee settlement of FLSA
agreements when doing so is not explicitly mandated by Congress.66

IV. ALLOWING PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE USING CONFIDENTIALITY
PROVISIONS
For better or worse, the legal environment is quickly embracing
oversight of FLSA settlements.67 While debating whether this
oversight should exist at all is a necessary inquiry, it is not this
Note’s primary focus. Rather, this Note assumes that courts will
oversee FLSA settlements. Based on a recent trend, courts are

64 Over 1800 cases were filed in the first quarter of 2018 alone. See Fair Labor Standards
TRACREPORTS
(Jan.
24,
2018),
Act
Lawsuits
Down
From
2015
Peak,
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/498/.
65 See
Federal
Judicial
Caseload
Statistics
2020,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2020
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2021) (indicating a general growth in federal case filings in 2020).
66 Of course, Diener reaches an opposite conclusion, arguing that oversight comports with
congressional intent under the FLSA to protect vulnerable employees, to ensure a minimum
standard of living, to ensure any private rights impacting the public interest are not hindered,
and to promote the FLSA’s uniform application. Diener, supra note 9, at 68. Though one
might wonder, if the increase in case load leads to the rubber-stamping of settlement
agreements, is oversight truly effective at achieving these goals, and ought it not be Congress
that makes the decision about policy effectiveness? Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”)
(emphasis added), with id. art III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court . . . .” ). As an aside, the argument concerning judicial efficiency
does not apply to Department of Labor oversight of these agreements, though the previously
mentioned reasons for not requiring oversight would still be applicable. See supra notes 60–
65 and accompanying text.
67 The two primary cases discussed in this area provide evidence for this trend: both require
oversight of agreements in at least some contexts. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United
States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that compromises of FLSA backwage or liquidation-damages claims are only permitted if supervised by the Department of
Labor or by a court); Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding that approval from a district court or the Department of Labor is required for
“stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims with prejudice”).
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attempting to go even further than this routine oversight by
requiring that settlements meet certain qualifications.68 Namely, as
a prerequisite to approval, courts are requiring that agreements
exclude confidentiality provisions.69
A number of district courts have found that confidentiality
provisions hinder the policies and purposes of the FLSA.70 For
example, a court in the Middle District of Florida—which is bound
by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lynn’s Food—held that
confidentiality provisions could never be permitted in an FLSA
settlement because they contravened the intent of the FLSA.71
Specifically, the court said that the confidentiality provision would
stop employees from exercising their rights under the FLSA and
would “effect[] a judicial confiscation of the employee’s right to be

68 See, e.g., Moreno v. Regions Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting
an FLSA settlement agreement because the “pervasive and unbounded scope of the release
is unfair and precludes a valid evaluation of the compromise”); Guerra v. Flores, 139 F. Supp.
3d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (requiring that settlements be made “on public record”
pursuant to the reasoning in Lynn’s Food).
69 See, e.g., Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1247 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“An
employee’s right to a minimum wage and overtime is unconditional, and the district court
should countenance the creation of no condition, whether confidentiality or any other
construct, that offends the purpose of the FLSA.”); Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F.
Supp. 3d 170, 177–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting a confidentiality provision in an FLSA
agreement because it would prevent public access to the settlement and would prohibit the
plaintiffs from openly discussing their experience with the litigation); Briggins v. Elwood Tri,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (rejecting a confidentiality provision for being
unfair because it “f[ell] unequally on the employees compared to the [employer]”).
70 Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d. at 1242 (“[A] confidentiality provision furthers resolution of no
bona fide dispute between the parties; rather, compelled silence unreasonably frustrates
implementation of the ‘private—public’ rights granted by the FLSA and thwarts Congress’s
intent to ensure widespread compliance with the statute.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704–08 (1945))); Brumley v. Camin Cargo
Control, Inc., Nos. 08-1798, 10-2461, 09-6128, 2012 WL 1019337, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2012)
(“[D]istrict courts have rejected as unreasonable settlement agreements that contain
confidentiality provisions, finding them unenforceable and operating in contravention [of] the
FLSA.”).
71 See Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1242–43 (“A confidentiality provision in an FLSA settlement
agreement both contravenes the legislative purpose of the FLSA and undermines the
Department of Labor’s regulatory effort to notify employees of their FLSA rights. . . . The
district court should reject as unreasonable a compromise that contains a confidentiality
provision, which is unenforceable and operates in contravention of the FLSA.”).
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free from retaliation for asserting FLSA rights.”72 In short, “the
employer thwarts the informational objective of the notice
requirement by silencing the employee who has vindicated a
disputed FLSA right.”73 Because “[a]n employee’s right to a
minimum wage and overtime is unconditional,” the court should not
approve any “condition, whether confidentiality or any other
construct, that offends the purpose of the FLSA.”74
Courts that strike confidentiality provisions receive much praise
from academics.75 Like some district courts, scholars argue that the
private litigant’s (employee’s) interest and the public interest in
disclosing FLSA settlement agreements outweigh the benefits of
confidentiality.76 While a few district courts have upheld the
agreement that litigants have negotiated,77 the trend for courts
reviewing these FLSA settlement agreements is to strike
confidentiality provisions.
A. PROTECTING THE EMPLOYEE

Admittedly, powerful arguments militate against upholding
confidentiality provisions in FLSA settlement agreements. After all,
employers likely have more bargaining power than individual
employees in settlement negotiations.78 A similar logic is used to

72 Id. at 1242; see also Brumley, 2012 WL 1019337, at *7 (citing cases from several district
courts that struck confidentiality provisions as contrary to the FLSA’s public policy).
73 Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1242, 1247.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 7, at 134 (discussing a “handful of cases recognizing the
imbalance of power between employer and employee”).
76 Id. at 112 (“[T]he rights of the general public and of similarly situated workers to know
when employers have violated the FLSA outweigh private litigants’ interests in keeping a
settlement confidential.”); see also Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic
Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 873 (2007) (arguing that “a ban
[on confidentiality provisions] might have efficient dynamic effects, such as deterring
frivolous lawsuits and improving market decisions”).
77 See infra notes 149–150 and accompanying text.
78 Wilkins, supra note 7, at 134 (describing “the imbalance of power between employer and
employee,” namely “the vulnerable position of low-wage litigants” when compared to
employers’ “important retaliatory tool . . . of subsequent breach of contract suits” for
confidentiality provisions).
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justify judicial oversight of FLSA settlement agreements in the first
instance.79
Even advocates for striking confidentiality provisions, however,
acknowledge that these provisions are potential bargaining chips
for employees during settlement negotiations.80 Beyond this
practical rationale for permitting confidentiality provisions in FLSA
settlements, freedom-of-contract principles ground larger critiques
of judicial paternalism in lieu of allowing the private parties to
contractually settle their legal disputes.81
As the subsequent discussion illustrates, if courts are to oversee
these settlements (as this Note assumes) then courts should only
evaluate the fair and proper process of entering a settlement, rather
than assessing the agreement’s substance. Such an approach
provides a middle ground between giving individual employees
broader bargaining power in these settlement negotiations while
ensuring that employers do not take advantage of the plaintiffemployee’s lack of legal sophistication to harm the plaintiffemployee or other employees implicated by the final agreement.
1. Freedom of Contract Compels Permitting Confidentiality
Provisions. Freedom of contract is the “basic right of an individual
to enter into agreements that gain or dispose of possessions, services
or otherwise alter legal relationships.”82 It has been a fundamental
freedom in the United States since the founding, as evidenced by
the inclusion of the Contract Clause in the U.S. Constitution.83 The
theory behind freedom of contract is that individual citizens should
be free to make contracts between themselves without state

Diener, supra note 9, at 65 (“The supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back
wages is intended to prevent harm to vulnerable employees who may be taken advantage of
by their employers.”); see also supra Section III.A.
80 Wilkins, supra note 7, at 126 (admitting that plaintiffs in FLSA cases might prefer
confidentiality when motivated by “need for quick payment of lost wages, litigation fatigue,
and a desire to hide the size of the settlement from family and friends to avoid requests for
money”).
81 See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
82 David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 56–57 (2013).
83 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
79
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interference.84 The rationale is that this freedom will result in both
better contracts and a freer marketplace, in turn spurring economic
growth.85
Beyond marketplace considerations, freedom to enter
contractual agreements pursuant to one’s wishes also illustrates the
government’s commitment to the dignity of persons in the form of
personal autonomy and free will.86 It is not only the economic sector
that is better off because of private contracts; people also experience
more freedom to choose between an array of options when states do
not interfere in their agreements.87
Of course, this freedom can be abused. At the pinnacle of
economic freedom of contract, the Lochner Era, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down a state law regulating the number of hours that
a baker could work as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.88
The Court held that this law was not a proper exercise of the state’s
police power89 because it was singling out an occupation, could lead
to uncontrolled regulation, and because the bakers should be the
ones protecting their health, not the state.90 The Court indicated
See Christopher Theodorou, Note, A Facial Reconstruction of Settlements: Analyzing the
Cheeks Decision on FLSA Settlements, 35 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 209, 237–39 (2017)
(detailing the theory behind freedom of contract as expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
during the Lochner era).
85 See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 729 (2010) (arguing that “contracts can be a
strategic tool in obtaining a competitive advantage” in the business context).
86 Cf., e.g., Jessica H. Munyon, Note, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion
of Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 717–20 (2003)
(arguing for female autonomy in choosing to enter into surrogacy contracts as a manifestation
of broader women’s rights).
87 See, e.g., id. at 720–22 (indicating that women who choose to enter surrogacy contracts
are able to do so with great financial benefit for themselves and would not enter the
agreements otherwise).
88 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It seems to us that the real object and
purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his
[employees] . . . . Under such circumstances the freedom of master and [employee] to contract
with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be
prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”).
89 Police power is typically thought of as the state’s ability to regulate the health, safety,
and morals of its citizenry. Id. at 53.
90 Id. at 59 (observing that the occupation of baking “is not an unhealthy [occupation] to
that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and
with the right of free contract on the part of the individual, either as employer or employ[ee]”).
84
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that a more direct relation between the regulation and the police
power was needed for the law to be a proper exercise of state
authority.91
In striking resemblance to arguments for FLSA settlement
agreement oversight, Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that the
majority disregarded unequal bargaining power between bakers
and employers.92 If the bakers could not actually bargain for their
rights, then freedom of contract was not being achieved, and the
state––not the court––had the power to step in on behalf of the
weaker bargaining party with legislation.93
The United States no longer operates in a Lochner world.94
Courts may interfere with contracts—beyond merely interpreting
regulations in light of government powers, as was the case in West
Coast Hotel and Carolene Products95—by striking down private
contracts for public policy reasons.96
Freedom of contract principles, however, have not vanished. Nor
should they. The tension felt in Lochner is a similar tension courts
face when forced to approve or disapprove of FLSA settlement
agreements. “[I]t becomes of great importance to determine which
shall prevail—the right of the individual to labor for such time as
91 Id. at 64 (“It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in
this section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in error
convicted, has no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon the health of the
[employee], as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law.”).
92 Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It may be that the statute had its origin, in part, in
the belief that employers and employ[ees] in such establishments were not upon an equal
footing . . . .”).
93 Id. (arguing that whether the law on bakers’ maximum working hours is “wise
legislation . . . is not the province of the court to inquire”).
94 In the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court sounded the death knell of the Lochner era with a
series of decisions upholding state and federal legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting the shipment of
adulterated milk under the Commerce Clause); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
400 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage statute for wages of female workers as a proper
exercise of state police power).
95 Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 154 (holding that the federal statute in question was “a
constitutional exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce”); W. Coast Hotel, 300
U.S. at 400 (upholding a state minimum-wage statute as “a matter for the legislative
judgment”).
96 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 82, at 65 (listing examples of “contracts void for violating
public policy”: unconscionability, overreaching restraints on trade, and contracts with illegal
purpose).
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he may choose, or the right of the State to prevent the individual
from laboring or from entering into any contract to labor . . . .”97
The government, including the courts, should be hesitant to
disregard the long-standing principle of allowing private parties to
freely enter agreements.98 From a pure freedom-of-contract
approach, employees whose rights under the FLSA have been
violated by employers should be afforded the opportunity to enter
freely into settlement agreements with fair terms. The reviewing
court should defer to the terms negotiated by the parties and reject
only those settlements which are grossly unfair to the employee.
Rejecting such a principle, as courts that categorically reject
confidentiality provisions do,99 disregards the history of private
agreements in the United States and the autonomy of employees to
craft a settlement that redresses the violation of their rights.
Of course, one must address the potential for abuse. This concern
would likely be the leading objection to the pure freedom-of-contract
approach to FLSA settlement agreements.100 Critics may argue that
because workers historically have had fewer rights and employers
generally exercise greater authority and leverage over employees
(which is partially why the FLSA mandates a minimum wage and

97 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54. This comparison may be attenuated because Lochner dealt with
a state regulation of labor conditions, whereas the FLSA is a federal statute regulating labor
conditions. Whether the regulation is passed under state police power or the Commerce
Clause, however, appears to make only a nominal difference, but nonetheless exhibits the
tension presented in both scenarios between an individual’s right to contract and the
government’s power to interfere with such a right. One might argue that the rationale for
state interference through police powers (as opposed to Commerce Clause power) better
comports with the arguments used by proponents of judicial oversight of FLSA settlement
agreements and striking the confidentiality provisions of the settlements. As a state police
power, regulating settlement of employment claims could be considered part of workers’
health and safety. This Note, however, does not delve further into the differences between
state police power and federal power under the Commerce Clause.
98 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 82, at 53 (arguing that limiting the right to contract based
on the status of the party alone is “an exception to the general rule of the freedom of contract”).
99 See, e.g., Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control, Inc., Nos. 08-1798, 10-2461, 09-6128, 2012
WL 1019337, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2012) (listing a half-dozen examples of courts that agree
with categorically rejecting confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements); Dees v.
Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d. 1227, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting confidentiality
provisions as “unreasonable” and “in contravention of the FLSA”).
100 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 7, at 132–43 (arguing that confidentiality contributes to
unequal bargaining power and leverage between employers and employees).
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provides for maximum working hours101), the courts must oversee
settlement agreements and strike confidentiality provisions. Such
supervision is needed either because employees, due to their lesser
bargaining power, lack capacity to enter the agreement freely or
because confidentiality could never be part of a bargained-for
exchange between employees and employers.102
The problem with the capacity argument for striking
confidentiality provisions is that it assumes too little of workers. To
have reached a settlement agreement at all, an employee would
have had to complete the following: (1) know their rights; (2) identify
a violation of their rights by their employer; (3) pursue some legal
education (through an attorney or independent research) to
comprehend their options for vindicating their rights; (4) initiate a
federal lawsuit against their employer; (5) have made a compelling
case for vindication to bring the employer to the bargaining table;
and (6) negotiate an agreement that satisfies both the parties.103
This is not an easy process, nor is it without cost. The employee
sacrifices time, money, and their potential reputation in choosing to
file suit.104 It is difficult to imagine that an employee, especially one
represented by counsel, would be unable to knowledgeably make a
decision about entering a confidentiality provision without knowing
how it would operate or its implications. There is no obvious reason
that an employee is less able to enter a confidentiality provision
than to enter the other provisions in the agreement. To assume
employee incapacity in entering a confidentiality provision would be
to assume the employee’s broader incapacity to enter the agreement
at all. If this is the case, then the court should not only be overseeing
these agreements—the court should be fashioning them, too.
The employer does have a superior bargaining position given its
resources, both legal and financial, to extract the best settlement for
101 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2018) (codifying the minimum wage requirements for employers); id.
§ 207 (codifying maximum hour limitations for employers).
102 Perhaps this Note goes too far in assuming that the objection would rely primarily on a
lack of meeting-of-the-minds between the parties or on a lack of capacity. Neverthless, courts
need some reason for the agreed-upon exchange to end before categorically striking these
agreements. As this Note will address, the FLSA also presents implications for the national
economy that might be the stronger argument for striking confidentiality provisions. See
discussion infra Section IV.B.
103 See supra Section II.C.
104 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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itself.105 The disparity in bargaining power is why courts oversee the
agreements for fairness and reasonableness in jurisdictions that
require such oversight.106 But this concern is assuaged by judicial
oversight of the process of the settlement (such as whether the
negotiations were fair, if the employee was represented by counsel,
etc.) and not the resulting settlement itself. This practice would best
preserve the employee’s personal vindication of their rights under
the FLSA and the freedom-of-contract principles foundational to the
U.S. political and legal system.
2. Confidentiality Gives Employees More Bargaining Leverage.
The next objection to less demanding court oversight of settlement
agreements is that confidentiality could never be part of a
bargained-for exchange between employers and employees.107
Supposedly, if employees knew what confidentiality meant for
themselves or the national economy of laborers, they would not
accept these provisions.
Ironically, the proponents of court oversight—who cite unequal
bargaining power between employers and employees as their
rationale—want to take away a significant bargaining chip held by
employees: confidentiality. Economically, the final settlement will
derive from a calculus of each party’s probability of victory, the
potential amount won by the plaintiff (or to be paid by the
105 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 129–30 (explaining how courts have approached the power
imbalance between employers and employees). Whether excluding confidentiality provisions
assists in counteracting this fact, however, is unclear.
106 See, e.g., Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“[T]here is only one context in which compromises of FLSA . . . claims may be allowed: a
stipulated judgment entered by a court which has determined that a settlement proposed by
an employer and employees, in a suit brought by the employees under the FLSA, is a fair and
reasonable [resolution] of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.”); Cheeks v. Freeport
Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 200 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s holding
that “parties cannot enter into private settlements of FLSA claims without either the
approval” of the courts or the Department of Labor).
107 See, e.g., Hogan v. Allstate Beverage Co., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1283–84 (M.D. Ala.
2011) (concluding that confidentiality provisions unequally benefit the employer); Dees v.
Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[A] confidentiality provision
furthers resolution of no bona fide dispute between the parties . . . .” (emphasis added)). It
appears that if unequal bargaining power cannot be sufficient for striking agreements, then
there would need to be some implicit duress or capacity problem. See Weber, supra note 82,
at 65 (listing examples of when courts may void a contract on public policy grounds:
unconscionability, overreaching restraints on trade, and contracts with illegal purposes).
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defendant), and the costs of adjudication.108 Part of the cost of
adjudication for the employer is the publicity the case receives
moving forward. Perhaps a significant portion, therefore, of the
employee’s leverage in settlement negotiations is offering the
defendant-employer confidentiality about the terms of the
agreement. Courts—not even the elected legislature in a policy
judgment—deciding that this leverage should not be afforded to the
plaintiffs hinders plaintiff-employees from fully vindicating their
rights under the FLSA and achieving the largest settlement
possible.
Beyond the financial incentive of receiving the settlement
amount, employees may themselves benefit from a confidentiality
provision—it might prevent the employer from discussing
unfavorable information about the employee. This idea has not been
discussed thoroughly, if at all, in the debate of confidentiality in
FLSA settlements. It is possible for confidentiality to run both ways,
though: protecting employers from the disclosure of settlement
numbers and protecting employees from disparagement by
employers in the future.109
Finally, even if employers are “coercing” employees into
confidential settlements by relying on unequal bargaining positions,
employees still have the option to not settle. Employees might
instead choose to go to trial instead of pursuing contract-resolution
of their claims. The cost of trial surely is a consideration, but a
rational employee—one who is unhappy with the proposed terms or
with the employer’s demand for confidentiality without adequate

108 An example illustrates this broader point: if a lawsuit is worth $50,000 and the costs of
adjudication are $10,000, then the lawsuit is valued at $40,000 to the plaintiff and potentially
costs the defendant $60,000. Therefore the “bargaining zone” for settlement is between
$40,000 and $60,000. This example does assume rational, wealth-maximizing behavior of the
litigants. See John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2009).
109 See Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #MeToo Challenges Confidentiality and
Nondisclosure Agreements, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 12, 14–15 (outlining the benefits to
employees of confidential harassment settlements in finding future employment and keeping
the details of the harassment private). As with any negotiation tool, if an employee asks for
reciprocal confidentiality, it may change how the parties value the settlement. But to
withhold an option from settlements that might be advantageous to both parties in certain
circumstances seems unwise, even assuming that the legislature mandated certain
settlement options instead of courts’ wholesale imposition of such restrictions.
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compensation for such silence—could always decline the settlement.
In fact, courts, when assessing these settlements, might rightly
assume that the employee has thought about the option of denying
the settlement and chosen to proceed with the settlement over the
option of trial.110
In sum, any concern with employees not truly wanting a
confidentiality provision in their settlement would be resolved by
judicial oversight the settlement process with a view to ensuring
that it is free of coercion and conducted with adequate capacity,
rather than categorically striking certain substantive provisions,
like confidentiality agreements.
B. PROTECTING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

The final objection to courts’ taking a more hands-off approach
towards confidentiality provisions in FLSA settlement agreements
is that public settlements are necessary to ensure that other
workers, whose rights have been violated, can bring future suits
under the FLSA.111 Congress undeniably passed the FLSA in part
to ensure a national revitalization of workers’ rights.112 And, as
previously discussed,113 this goal makes sense in the post-Great
Depression context during which the FLSA came to existence.114 So,

110 In striking these provisions, courts may, in effect, be forcing the parties into a trial if
the employer is unwilling to settle without the promise of silence and is willing to take the
risk of a factfinder’s finding of a violation. See Kotkin, supra note 13, at 929 (“Employers
regularly assert that no settlement will be reached without confidentiality.”).
111 For example, Wilkins argues that FLSA suits resemble government agency enforcement
and public hazard cases: each action protects the public writ large, in addition to those
directly affected. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 120–24. Therefore, confidential FLSA
settlements should be prohibited because invisible settlements stifle other FLSA suits and
broader vindication of national labor rights. See id. at 124 (“[B]ecause the regulatory scheme
is thwarted and other members of the public similarly injured when the company is allowed
to cover up wrong-doing, a . . . norm against confidentiality should apply.”)..
112 This intent is evidenced by the statute’s language, which states that Congress found
“labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers” to be unfair and harmful
to the national workforce. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2018).
113 See discussion supra Section II.A.
114 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 113 (discussing how Congress passed the FLSA in order to
provide workers with rights by creating “a minimum standard for working conditions” and
“to preserve a healthy economy”).
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even assuming that courts adopt a freedom-of-contract theory of
FLSA settlement agreements and believe that workers should be
given greater bargaining leverage with confidentiality provisions,
the public interest in knowing the outcome of cases and the
existence of employers who violate the FLSA may still outweigh an
individual plaintiff’s interest in confidentiality.115
This argument posits that employees will not know of their rights
under the FLSA or that their employers’ actions are violating those
rights if they do not have the requisite information provided by
public suits and settlements.116 One way of ensuring such
knowledge is for employees to talk amongst themselves, sharing
experiences
about
potential
violations
and
settlement
117
By inserting confidentiality provisions into
agreements.
settlement agreements, employers stifle these conversations,
halting any exchange of information between employees.118
Some scholars have compared confidentiality in the FLSA
context to government agency enforcement and hazard litigation in
that more information and disclosure of claims is better for the

115 As previously noted, this argument better comports with the Commerce Clause
constitutional hook under which Congress adopted the FLSA. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. The Commerce Clause relates to the overall economic condition of the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (giving Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”). Some arguments about FLSA settlement oversight
and confidentiality, however, focus on the individual’s lack of bargaining power and unequal
leverage compared to the employer. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 129–30 (discussing unequal
bargaining power in FLSA settlement negotiations). For this reason, the “quasi-public”
nature of the FLSA is more amenable to the constitutional rationale for the statute itself and,
accordingly, should be given due consideration. Id. at 112–14.
116 This asymmetry of information is why there are strenuous posting requirements
imposed on employers to ensure that employees know of their statutory rights in the
workplace. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2020) (requiring that “[e]very employer employing any
employees subject to the [FLSA’s] minimum wage provisions shall post and keep posted a
notice explaining the [FLSA] . . . in conspicuous places in every establishment where such
employees are employed”).
117 Wilkins, supra note 7, at 132 (“Similarly situated employees are the people most likely
to benefit from information about a previous suit and those who a plaintiff is most likely to
want to help after his or her litigation has finished.”).
118 Id. (“This is the concrete mechanism by which employers use their leverage in litigation
to thwart the purposes of the FLSA—by using their superior bargaining position to prevent
the otherwise natural flow of information from one employee to another within a company.”).
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public writ large.119 The FLSA, however, is more appropriately
compared to other workers’ rights statutes, such as the ADEA and
Title VII, where confidentiality provisions are not prohibited from
settlement agreements as a matter of course. Further, court
oversight of FLSA settlement process and procedure—not the actual
substance of the agreement—can ease any national economy
concerns not present with other workers’ rights statutes.
1. Confidentiality and Other Worker-Regulation Statutes. The
FLSA is not the only workers’ rights statute that Congress passed
to protect employees in the workplace.120 Other relevant workerprotection statutes include Title VII,121 the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA),122 and the ADEA.123 Congress passed each
statute to make the work environment more amenable to
employees, but each law addresses different types of employees and
work situations.
Title VII was passed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prohibit discrimination in employment.124 Under Title VII,
employers cannot discriminate on the basis of “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”125 Title VII protects covered employees from
discrimination in hiring and discharge decisions and in
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”126
Title VII also protects against any discriminatory acts that would
tend to “deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”127 When it

119 Id. at 121–24 (comparing confidentiality in FLSA settlements with agency enforcement
actions and public hazard litigation).
120 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2018) (codifying the ADEA “to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment”); id. § 2601(b)(2) (2018) (codifying the FMLA “to entitle
employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons” or for child care); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (2012) (codifying Title VII to prohibit workplace discrimination).
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
122 Id. §§ 2601–54 (2018).
123 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2018).
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018) (defining “unlawful employment practice[s]” for
employers).
125 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
126 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
127 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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comes to confidentiality, however, “courts are . . . likely to enforce
secrecy provisions in [Title VII] settlement agreement[s].”128
The FMLA protects employees who are required to leave
employment temporarily for family or medical reasons.129
Particularly, it entitles employees to unpaid leave for up to twelve
workweeks per year for various illnesses or family-related
obligations.130 The FMLA previously was subject to the same
judicial or Department of Labor oversight of settlement agreements,
but this oversight is no longer required.131
The ADEA protects employees age forty and older from
discrimination based on their age.132 The ADEA makes it illegal for
an employer to hire or fire an employee based on age or to alter
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of age.133
The ADEA, Title VII, and the FMLA are anti-discrimination
statutes that specifically apply in the employment context.134 The
fact that these statutes touch on labor relations, however, makes
them more apt comparisons for the FLSA than government
Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV.
229, 249 (2018). The secrecy of these settlement agreements has also been criticized. Id. at
255 (noting that “such settlements are problematic because they impair ‘the right of the public
to know’” (quoting Kotkin, supra note 13, at 947)).
129 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2018) (stating that the FMLA’s purpose is “to entitle
employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child,
and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition”).
130 Id. § 2612(a)(1) (2018) (entitling “eligible employee[s] . . . to a total of 12 work-weeks of
leave” per year for certain reasons).
131 See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox
News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN. ST. L. REV. 463, 516 n.401 (2018)
(noting that FMLA regulations were “revised in 2009 to permit private, confidential FMLA
settlements” without court or Department of Labor approval (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d)
(2017))).
132 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2018) (stating that the ADEA’s purpose is “to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment”); id. § 631(a) (2018) (limiting ADEA
protections to those over the age of forty).
133 Id. § 623(a)(1).
134 Lau, supra note 9, at 241 (comparing generally applicable employment statutes, Title
VII and the Family and Medical Leave Act, with the ADEA and FLSA, statutes designed to
help specific types of workers, such as older workers and “the most vulnerable, lowest paid
segments of the workforce”).
128
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enforcement actions or hazard litigation.135 In particular, the FMLA
presents itself as an important comparator to determine if
confidentiality provisions should be permitted in FLSA settlements
because, like the FLSA, it deals with employee rights and is
enforced by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division.136
In all federal labor statutes other than the FLSA, judicial
oversight of settlements is not required, and courts do not
automatically strike confidentiality provisions in settlement
agreements.137 Compellingly, the Department of Labor used to
require judicial or Department of Labor approval of FMLA
settlements.138 A key distinction must be drawn, however, from this
previous FMLA requirement and the FLSA’s current judicial
approval requirement: the Department of Labor passed this
regulation, instead of the courts’ reading it into a federal statute.139
This prior FMLA regulation proves that the Department of Labor
can insert a judicial oversight requirement into worker rights
statutes and has chosen, even if implicitly, not to do so for the FLSA.
Because controversy exists surrounding whether courts should
exercise judicial oversight of settlement agreements in the first
place, the argument that courts should use that oversight to
categorically strike negotiated provisions from settlement
agreements is even more tenuous.140
See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 121–24.
29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2018) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to enforce the provisions
of the FMLA); id. § 216(c) (allowing the DOL to enforce the FLSA).
137 Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323, 327 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
unsupervised ADEA settlements are not per se invalid); Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence:
Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 658 n.209 (1999)
(indicating a court’s distinction between ADEA charges, which relay information to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and cannot be waived, and causes of action, which
allow the employee to recover for a violation of rights and can be waived); Nuñez, supra note
131, at 516 (stating that “public approval of FMLA settlements is no longer required by DOL
regulations”); Tippett, supra note 128, at 249 (stating that “courts are more likely to enforce
secrecy provisions in a [Title VII] settlement agreement, on the theory that it promotes
dispute resolution”).
138 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2018).
139 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2020) (“Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce
employees to waive, their prospective rights under FMLA. . . . This does not prevent the
settlement or release of FMLA claims by employees . . . without the approval of the
Department of Labor or a court.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2018).
140 See supra Part III.B.
135
136
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2. Why the FLSA Should Not Be Treated Differently. In the FMLA
and ADEA, the legal situations most comparable to the FLSA, much
less is required of settlement agreements.141 Opponents might argue
that it is not the FLSA that has taken the wrong approach, but the
other labor statutes. However, such a pronounced change to the
dynamic of bringing and settling employment claims is not a
decision for courts to make, but rather a policy judgment that ought
to be left to the legislature or the DOL, the agency tasked with
enforcing the FLSA.
Other practical problems arise from relying on courts to usher in
this change to settling employment claims. As we have seen in the
FLSA context, circuit splits between the level and type of judicial
oversight have led to inconsistency and confusion for employers and
employees when settling cases.142 If courts begin to dabble in
changing the process of not one, but four labor statutes, then more
confusion will ensue. This confusion may undermine consistency in
a way that affects the national economy—ironically the very thing
these laws attempt to stabilize.143
A further criticism of a freedom-of-contract approach to FLSA
settlements is that the FLSA is more concerned with the national
economy—specifically with how wage and hour restrictions might
result in a “race to the bottom”—than are the FMLA, Title VII, or
the ADEA.144 However, especially in the discrimination context, the
broader discrimination issue is typically framed in a wider national

See infra note 144.
See infra Part III.
143 The value of consistency is often a rationale in commercial law, but it is relevant for the
FLSA context because, as a labor and employment statute, it governs commercial
relationships. Cf. Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
2820, 2820 (Jan. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 791) (updating the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of “joint employer status” under the FLSA “to promote certainty for
employers and employees, reduce litigation, promote greater uniformity among court
decisions, and encourage innovation in the economy”).
144 The FMLA, Title VII, and ADEA are more concerned with an individual employee’s
rights being violated by discriminatory treatment on account of family necessity, race or sex
discrimination, or age discrimination. See supra note 120. The FLSA, in contrast, deals less
with a characteristic of the employee causing difference in treatment, but rather with the
employer’s actions having an adverse impact on the employee. See Lau, supra note 9, at 262
(“The FLSA’s characteristics also call for it to be treated differently than other federal
employment statutes.”).
141
142
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manner than individual cases.145 It would be inconsistent and
harmful to equality movements to say that individuals are the only
ones affected by discrimination in the workplace; there is evidence
that more diverse and inclusive employment practices create a
better, more productive working environment.146
Additionally, even if this criticism is true, a comparison of the
FLSA to other employment statutes is more productive and useful
for this discussion than a comparison of the FLSA to nonemployment contexts, like government enforcement and hazard
litigation, where suits sometimes lack distinct, individual
plaintiffs.147 Because the most apt comparators to the FLSA do not
limit confidentiality, or even require judicial oversight of settlement
agreements, courts should be hesitant to impose such limitations on
FLSA employee-plaintiffs seeking to bargain freely and use
confidentiality as leverage in negotiations to obtain larger
settlements. Further, courts can resolve any concerns about the
national economy by assessing whether the settlement agreement’s
process and procedure ensures fairness to all employees, rather
than by categorically excluding confidentiality provisions from
these agreements.
C. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

Confidentiality is not without flaws.148 Many of the criticisms of
confidentiality in the FLSA context do raise questions about
enforcing the broader purposes of the FLSA in a legal environment
See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 13, at 969–71 (using an example of a confidentiality
provision in a prior settlement agreement that affected the outcome of other employees’
claims).
146 See, e.g., Stacy L. Hawkins, The Long Arc of Diversity Bends Towards Equality:
Deconstructing the Progressive Critique of Workplace Diversity Efforts, 17 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 61, 67 (2017) (justifying workplace diversity efforts because they
“ensur[e] responsiveness,” “improv[e] performance,” and “signal[] . . . openness of the
workplace”); Suman Reddy, Diversity is the Superhero with an Invisible Cape,
ENTREPRENEUR INDIA (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/340451
(discussing benefits of diversity, including creating competitive business advantage, helping
organizations grow globally, and aiding in consumer service).
147 Wilkins, supra note 7, at 121–22 (comparing private and public rights enforcement).
148 See id. at 135–43 (criticizing confidentiality for undermining access to courts); Kotkin,
supra note 13, at 961–71 (arguing that confidentiality prohibits other plaintiffs from bringing
suit and the courts from executing justice).
145
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where confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements abound.
This Note concludes with two practical points for handling
confidentiality issues with FLSA suits.
First, courts should engage in a nuanced inquiry into the process
of crafting the settlement and the nature of the confidentiality
restrictions in settlement agreements to determine if they are
permissible. Some federal district courts have already begun doing
so.149 Instead of categorically rejecting confidentiality provisions,
courts should weigh the employee’s freedom to contract with the
potential for employer abuse of unequal bargaining power.150
This manner of assessing confidentiality is not perfect and raises
theoretical questions about why certain types of confidentiality
should be permissible while others should not be. This more
nuanced approach may also require more judicial resources and
effort than the current categorical rejection of confidentiality
provisions. Limiting the inquiry to an assessment of the process,
however, would lessen this burden. If courts are going to be the
primary party in reviewing FLSA settlements, however, balancing
these contradicting interests appears to be the most equitable and
logical approach.
Second, even if courts continue to permit confidentiality
provisions, and assuming that confidentiality impedes other
employees from bringing claims due to a lack of information, the
Department of Labor can still bring enforcement actions against
employers on behalf of a class of employees.151 Congress expressly
permits Department of Labor enforcement of FLSA violations in the
statute.152 So, even if individual employees are less likely to bring
enforcement actions due to the greater prevalence of confidentiality
provisions, the Department of Labor—with greater resources and
capacity to oversee employers and collect information—can and
149 See, e.g., Farris v. Nat’l Forensic Consultants, Inc., No. 18-3052, 2019 WL 2502267, at
*6–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2019) (finding that the confidentiality provision need not be stricken
because it only limited disclosure concerning the negotiations leading to the settlement and
therefore was “narrowly drawn and thus [did] not frustrate the FLSA’s purpose”).
150 Id. at *3 (describing the court’s “two-part fairness inquiry” into proposed settlements,
one part of which “ensure[s] that . . . the settlement is fair and reasonable for the
employee(s)”).
151 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2018) (explaining the Department of Labor’s authority to initiate
enforcement actions).
152 Id.
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should fill this potential gap. Given that there is a viable alternative
for the DOL to bring suit against employers violating the FLSA, it
makes no sense to stop an individual employee who is bringing suit
from using a confidentiality provision to achieve the greatest
settlement value possible.153 Thus, courts that allow confidentially
provisions in some contexts give plaintiff-employees greater
bargaining leverage, while potential DOL enforcement counteracts
any concerns created by confidentiality provisions.

V. CONCLUSION
This Note illustrates how confidentiality may not be an evil,
which prohibits employees from settling claims of FLSA violations,
but rather a tool for employees to settle their claims more effectively
out of court for the greatest return possible. If courts are to be
involved in overseeing these agreements, they should look to
whether the settlement agreement’s process and procedure were
fair and reasonable under the circumstances, instead of
categorically excluding particular provisions from these
agreements. If courts were to conduct this assessment, then courts
would ensure that employees are not taken advantage of and would
also give employees the greatest leverage possible when resolving
their claims.

153 When the Department of Labor brings an FLSA claim on behalf of a group of employees,
the employees received proportional compensation. Id. (“Any sums thus recovered by the
Secretary of Labor on behalf of an employee . . . shall be held in a special deposit account and
shall be paid, on order of the Secretary of Labor, directly to the employee or employees
affected.”).
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